The democratic deficit in the European Union (EU)

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ABSTRACT:

Changing the nature of the EU through treaties from economic to political has raised many questions concerning the democratic deficit. The main question is whether there is a democratic deficit in the EU? if so, how could it be reduced? This article addresses the theories of some notable EU Scholars regarding the democratic deficit and analyses their solutions for the issue. The first section examines the concept of democratic deficit in the light of the arguments of Hix, Majone, and Moravcsik. According to Hix, the EU suffers from a lack of accountability, weak parliament, and indirect legitimacy. In contrast, Majone and Moravcsik believe that the EU does not need to be legitimized in a similar way of democratic states because it is considered as a regulatory state. The second section studies the democratic deficit between the redistributive policies where there are winners and losers similar to majoritarian, and regulative policies where there are no losers even if all are not winners. The final section explores the solutions provided by the abovementioned scholars with highlighting the view of Hix. Accordingly, the scholars unanimously agree on the existence of democratic deficits to some extent as the EU acts like both intergovernmental and supranational organisation concurrently.

KEY WORDS: European Union, Democratic Deficit, Legitimacy, Hix.
1. INTRODUCTION

Dahl (1998: P107) arguing that the size of governments and the citizen participation are correlated negatively. Therefore, the need for the delegation is almost inevitable especially in international organizations. If the large scale representative claim being democratic, they need to have maximum citizen participation and must be subject to a popular control (Dahl 1999: P31). From this standpoint, the study and debate about the democratic deficit in the EU became wide spread in 1990s, when the European Union (EU) gained political powers without enough supervision from the parliament or the court reviews. One of the aims of The European Single Act was “to rectify the democratic deficit in the community’s decision-making process”. It added the political and social power to the previously economic nature of the EU which led to concerns about “democratic deficit” both by the pro- and anti-Europeans. It became a serious issue in the 1990s, when the level of support for the EU was very low, especially after the Maastricht Treaty (Hix, 2008: P 67 and Zweifel, 2002: P812). Schmitter (2003; 83) considers the Danish no to the Maastricht treaty and “petit oui” in France as an evidence of the awareness of citizens of the EU member states to the impact of the EU policies on their lives as they consider the EU to be unaccountable which consequently affects the EU legitimacy. Furthermore, the failure of the EU constitutional treaty referendum has had a big impact on the way that the EU is seen by the scientists and the people (Follesdal and Hix, 2006: P533).

There are many definitions to the democratic deficit in the EU, but the main explanation is given by Weiler et al. (1995) in what he calls the “standard version” of the democratic deficit, which is a collection of the used arguments by the academics, media, and ordinary citizens. He points out that transferring the power from the member states to the EU has weakened the scrutinizing role of the national parliaments, arguing that the European Parliament is relatively weak and lacks the proper European-wide election. By adding some elements from Hix (2011: P132) the current standard version of democratic deficit involves five main points which will be explained
and analyzed individually. However, many of these arguments are refuted by Majone and Moravcsik. Majone arguing that EU does not need to be legitimized in a similar way to democratic states, because he considers the EU to be a “regulatory state” where the policies are based on the “Pareto- efficiency”. This means that the EU policies outcome are not “redistributive” and value-a locative where there are some people better off at the cost of others (Hix and Høyland, 2011:P133 and Majone, 2002). Majone assumes that if the level of the credibility rose the legitimacy of the EU would increase and consequently the citizen’s concern about the democratic deficit would be disappeared (Follesdal and Hix, 2006: P538).

Moreover, Moravcsik criticizes the main points of the standard version of democratic deficit arguing that governments of the member states, which are represented in the executive bodies of the EU, have a direct accountability (Hix and Høyland, 2011:P134 and Moravcsik, 2002). Furthermore, he argues that “Constitutional checks and balances, indirect democratic control via national governments, and the increasing powers of the European Parliament, are sufficient in ensuring that EU policy-making is, in nearly all cases, clean, transparent, effective and politically responsive to the demands of European citizens”. (Moravcsik, 2002: P605). However, while Moravcsik refutes the standard version of the democratic deficit, Hix concerns about the lack of the real contestation over the direction of the policies and suggests a solution which will be discussed in the later sections (Hix and Høyland, 2011:P130).

There might be a great deal of literature on the EU’s democratic deficit, there is an evident ambiguity and confusion among scholars. This paper attempts to present the view of the most prominent scholars and clarify the issue in light of their scholarly recommendations. The paper exploits an analytical method to address the issue. In other words, this study analyzes the most significant arguments for and against the “democratic deficit” by employing the arguments from Hix, Moravcsik, Majone and other scholars, aiming to shed the light on the recommended solutions. To achieve this, the first section focuses on the debate on five main points of standard version of the democratic deficit individually. The second section examines the democratic deficit between the redistributive and regulative policies through addressing the arguments of Majone and Hix. The last section
outlines the solutions to reduce the democratic deficit by highlighting the Hix’s solutions in which he supports the presidential model rather than the parliamentarian for the EU. The paper finally concludes the arguments and recommends some realistic solutions supported by Hix.

THE HIX’S STANDARD VERSION OF THE DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT:

1.1 Lack of Accountability and Legitimacy:

The first aspect of the democratic deficit of the EU is that national parliaments become weaker when the EU becomes more integrated as they cannot control the decisions of the officials who represent their government at the EU level (Follesdal and Hix, 2006: P535 and Hix, 2008: P 68). In other words, ministers at the Commission and the Council can make decisions at the EU level without being accountable to their national parliaments as the main executive bodies of the EU have the final say in most of the decision-making procedures. Sometimes governments see themselves on the losing side in the qualified majority voting in the Council, which makes the Executive institutions out of the control of the national parliaments which consequently affects the legitimacy of the EU (Hix and Høyland, 2011:P132).

In contrast, Moravcsik argues that international institutions can obtain their legitimacy indirectly through the authorities of the nation states, which already have their own legitimacy (Beetham and Lord, 1998:P12). In response to the argument that power has allocated to the executive, Moravcsik argues that accountability not only lies in the European elections, but also in the democratically elected governments, whose actions are scrutinized by the national parliaments and the national media. Therefore, ministers in the executive institutions of the EU are accountable to the citizens of their national governments and that challenges the democratic deficit of the EU (Follesdal and Hix, 2006: P539). Additionally, Moravcsik (2002: P612) also states that, “If European elections were the only form of democratic accountability to which the EU were subject, skepticism
would surely be warranted. Yet, a more important channel lies in the democratically-elected governments of the Member States, which dominate the still largely territorial and intergovernmental structure of the EU”.

Hix (2008:P 72) partially agrees with Moravcsik, but he has concerns about the “qualified majority voting” system which makes the EU more like a supranational rather than intergovernmental body. It becomes more challenging for the governments of member states to protect themselves from some of the unfavorable policy outcomes. The move from the intergovernmental to the supranational nature means that national governments have less control, while they are most accountable body towards their citizens. Equally, Beetham argues that the EU is accountable to member states, and the member states are responsible for appointing the officials in the EU. However, the problem is that these officials will seek their own autonomy which enables them to avoid accountability to their national governments. Therefore, the more EU becomes supranational the more direct accountability is needed (Beetham and Lord, 1998: P14).

1.2 Powerlessness of the European Parliament

Despite of many changes in the EU treaties, the EU parliament is still weaker than executive bodies like the Council and Commission because legislations in the EU are made by consultation procedures and the parliament have equal power with the council under the co-decision procedures. Additionally, the commissioners are appointed by the governments of the member states and the veto power against the governments’ choices does not stop the Commissioners becoming the main agendas setters (Follesdal and Hix, 2006: P535 and Hix, 2008: P 69). Therefore, the loss of the national parliaments’ power has not been compensated by increasing the power of the European parliament, which has led to the weak connection between the citizens and the MEPs (Hix and Høyland, 2011:P132).

Contrary to this, Moravcsik argues that in the last two decades the power of the European Parliament has increased significantly in terms of legislations and appointing the Commissioners. He also argues that the policy-making in the EU is very transparent with a careful consideration of both national and European interests.
because the policies and actions should go through the judicial review by both national courts and European Court of Justice (Hix and Høyland, 2011:P134 and Moravcsik, 2002,2008). Moreover, He points out that the treaty changes has improved the power of the EU Parliament because the co-decision procedures, the Qualified Majority Voting in the Council, and the veto power of the Parliament against the selection of the Commission has limited the dominant agenda-setting powers by the Commission (Follesdal and Hix, 2006: P539 and Moravcsik, 2002). Hix agrees in that point with Moravcsik as he states that parties are more organized and cohesive in the European Parliament and the coalitions are formed on the basis of left-right ideological dimension as well as the European Parliament now has more power both in terms of legislations making and control over the budget. However, it still needs to be more powerful (Hix et al, 2005 and FOLLESDAL and HIX 2006:P553).

1.3 The Absence of European Elections

The claimers of the absence of the European election argue that neither national elections nor the EU parliamentary elections are considered as European, apart from the referendums on new memberships or new treaties. This is because citizens are not able to choose between the different policies at the European level as in the national elections and national parties keep the European issues out of the national agenda. Moreover, even in the EU parliament elections, the European agendas are not prioritized “as parties and the media treat them as mid-term national contests” leading some of the EU scholars like Reif and Schmitt to call it “second-order national contests”. Additionally, Blondel argues that European elections are based on the citizens’ attitudes to the EU who has very little impact on them as the latest result of the EU Parliament elections shows that citizens voted against the ruling parties without considering their policies on the EU. That means the EU policy has had a little impact on the citizens (Follesdal and Hix, 2006: P536, Hix, 2008:P 70, and Hix and Høyland, 2011:P132).

According to Moravcsik, European issues are less important in the mind of the voters because taxation,
welfare, and health and education policies are controlled by the national governments, so there is not any fault if voters consider the European elections irrelevant. In this aspect, Moravcsik supports Majone’s argument that separates the regulatory policy maker “bureaucrats” from the democratic majorities (Moravcsik, 2002: P 614-15). However, Hix argues that the pure European election can only be held when the national contestations are not mixed with the EU elections, which is hard to achieve because national parties are treating the EU elections as a “mid-term” elections to evaluate the performance of the national governments (Hix, 1997:P6).

Furthermore, Hix’s main concern is about the political contest both in terms of directions of policies and the race for the top positions on the European level. Despite the fact that European Parliament is elected, the competitions are more about the national issues rather than European, as the turnout and participation of the voters is very low compare to the national elections. Moreover, the parties are evaluated on their achievement in their national governments rather than EU level. While referendums are considered to be better as citizens have direct choices of the policies, it is merely done on the treaties and joining the EU (FOLLESDAL and HIX 2006:P552).

1.4 Lack of the connection with the Voters

The distance of voters from the EU is another issue of the democratic deficit which is explained institutionally and psychologically. The former is about the council and the commission as they have a legislative and executive role and not elected directly or indirectly by the citizens. The latter is about that EU cannot be understood by the citizens easily by the fact that the institutions of the EU are different from the national ones. Even if European Parliament holds a democratic election citizens will still have a lack of connection with the confusable institutions (Follesdal and Hix, 2006: P536 and Hix, 2008: P 67-70). This is because “Commission is neither a government nor a bureaucracy” which is appointed through the complex procedure rather than elected and the complicated nature of the debates in the European parliament. It is harder for the ordinary citizens to understand the political preferences (Hix and Høyland, 2011:P132).
Opposed to that view, Moravcsik argues that the procedure of policy making in the EU is more transparent than the national governments since everyone has the right to access the documents and information. Moreover the policies are scrutinized by both national and European parliament and the role of both national courts and the European court of justice cannot be ignored in the judicial review of the policies. However, despite the fact that Hix agrees with Moravcsik on the transparency of the EU, he thinks that the council needs to be more transparent especially in the law making with the Parliament under the co-decision procedure (Hix, 2008:P74). Furthermore he argues that it would be clearer for citizens to learn how the policies would affect their life, if there is a debate on the issues (Hix and Høyland, 2011:P135).

1.5 Deficiency in Reflection of the Citizens Preferences

The “policy drift” is a result of the previous factors that the majority of citizens do not support the EU policies in many member states. For example, the policies about the market and agriculture, as the member states are undertaking policies which cannot be pursued in the domestic level because of the constraints by the various factors like Parliament, interest groups, and parties (Follesdal and Hix, 2006: P537 and Hix, 2008:P71). Scharpf (1999) argues that “policy drift” is a “social democratic” critique as they state that the EU policies are more biased to the centre-right “median voter”.

Against the “social democratic” critiques, Moravcsik argues that the process of policy making goes through so many checks and balances which ensure that the consensus is reached before the policy is agreed. The proof is that both radical left and right wingers unhappy because the outcome of the policies are moderate and “centrist” (Hix and Høyland, 2011:P134 and Moravcsik, 2002). Hix (2008:P 75) agrees with the Moravcsik’s argument to the point that most of the policy outcomes in the EU is “centrist” as the far left or far right parities like French Social Party and the British Conservative Party refuse the centrist outcomes of the EU policies. However, he argues that Moravcsik’s claims are not enough to decide that EU is democratic because of the lack of political contestation and debate over the policy direction which would make it difficult to know whether
the citizens’ preferences match with the policies outcomes or not  (Hix and Høyland, 2011:P135).

Furthermore, he states that Moravcsik’s answer to the social democratic critiques is unsatisfying because the “status of no-agreement” does not guarantee the “Centrist” policy outcomes. For example, the freedom of market indicates to the center-right policy outcomes and under the qualified majority voting system and the control of “agenda-setting” by the Commission, national governments have less control over the policies of the EU. Member states only have influence in some of the policy areas that has the intergovernmental nature like foreign, defense, and monetary policies but they have less control over the supranational nature of policies such as immigration (FOLLESDAL and HIX 2006:P544).

2. Democratic Deficit between the Regulative and Redistributive Policies

Majone sees the EU as a “regulatory state” on the basis of the “Pareto-efficient”, where there is not a loser even if all are not a winner, rather than “redistributive and value-a locative” where there are winners and losers. Additionally, he argues that the policies of the EU should not be dealt with on the basis of majoritarian democracy similar to the domestic governments because that would stop them to be “Pareto-efficient” and the last result of the policies would be against the political minority in the short term and the majorities interests in the long term (Follesdal and Hix, 2006: P538).

Majone detects that the EU policies should engage with the “regulation of goods, services, capital, and labor in the single market” and avoiding the procedures of the majoritarian democracy. He also argues that the more Commission is independent from the influence of the member states and the control of the European Parliament the more capable it becomes in making the economic, social, and environmental policies which benefit all member states (Hix and Høyland, 2011:P133). Weiler looks at the same point in different angle as he states that “the ideological neutrality” of the EU comes from the fact that the left-right dimension of the policies cannot be agreed together and that provided the ground for the EU to be led by the bureaucrats with the more agenda setting power for the Commission  (Beetham and Lord, 1998:P19).
In other words, Majone argues that, the more EU is politicized, the more legitimacy is undermined because if the internal market framework is established according to the majoritarian democratic politics consequently the EU would be either a neo-liberal or social democrat framework. Both cases would lead to a big disagreement from the losing side and the legitimacy of the EU would be affected (Hix and Høyland, 2011:P133). Therefore, the officials in the Commission, Council and other EU agencies are further expected to defend citizens’ interests rather than the majority in the European Parliament (Majone, 2002).

Hix agrees on the normative level that there are some policies with the Pareto-efficient effects which could be separated from the majoritarian democratic procedures. However, he states that Majone’s arguments are faced with a problem at the practical level because most EU policies have a redistributive effect. For example, the small producers in the local markets are the main losers in the free trade policies of the single market. Similarly, businesses are the losers in the environmental policies particularly in setting standards for industry emissions and the employees are the main winners in the social policies like fair and equal pay for all. Additionally, There is a very clear example in the expenditure policies of the EU which seems to be beneficial for all but there are actual winners and losers on the individual level as the winners are mostly farmers, research scholars, and poor areas and the losers are the citizens who pay tax and the consumers of the products and services. He also states that Majone does not explain why such policies should be separated from the democratic competitions (FOLLESDAL and HIX 2006:P544).

Moreover, Hix claims that Majone’s argument is more suitable for the period of the “market-creating” stage of the EU. The EU has passed this stage now, and it has to choose between different economic and social policies in the internal market which they have a redistributive results in other words winners and losers. This indicates to the new challenges political in nature facing the EU and different actors find themselves on different sides of the policy. (Hix and Høyland, 2011:P135).

Majone believes in the technocratic management of the differences in the EU which is based on the political
ground which means transferring the power from public to technocrats with the limited accountability (Beetham and Lord, 1998:P19). While Majone defends indirect legitimacy, Beetham and Lord (1998:P16) argue that the indirect legitimacy could have a negative effect on the legitimacy of the member states. For example the policy of the monetary union after the Maastricht treaty could have a negative impact on the domestic economy of some of the member states.

Furthermore, Beetham and Lord (1998:P12) describe the indirect legitimacy as “weak” which is derived from the governments of the member states but there are some doubts about this type of legitimacy. While the EU has its legitimacy indirectly through the member states, its policies have a direct impact on the lives of citizens especially in the policies like “preservation of fish stocks, the reduction of agricultural surpluses”. Individual cooperation is also needed for the implementation of some policies as well as the member states therefore the more individuals affected directly by the policies the more direct legitimacy needed for the enforcement of these policies (Beetham and Lord, 1998:P13).

3. SOLUTIONS

The way that scientists approach the EU problems has a significant impact on the solutions that they put forward, for example Majone (2006: P 620) argues that the EU has a legitimacy deficit, rather than democratic deficit particularly in the commission because he considers the EU as a regulatory polity. That is why he believes in the procedural solutions, such as clearer and more transparent decision-making process in the EU, better “review by courts and ombudsmen”, more expertise and technical skills, and better care for minority concerns and interests. This is because if the European Parliament or directly voted commission controls the EU, it would lead to the politicization of the regulated policy of the EU and subsequently would lead to the redistributive results rather than Pareto efficient (Majone 1998: P 21).

In contrast, Hix points out that the EU has a problem in the practical side of democracy which is mentioned
by Joseph Schumpeter and it relates to what democratic political contains. He states that it is not enough to have only the democratic procedure without the contestation over the policies and power. Consequently, Hix claims that the contest for the public offices and policies in democratic systems is arranged in two models. First, “competitive party government” which the leader of the winning party of the election will become the leader of the executive and implement the party policies. This model gives citizens indirect influence on the outcome of the policies. Second, the presidential model or the referendums where the citizens have a direct influence by electing who will hold the office and what is his policy or in the referendums where the policies directly chosen. The parties have a big role by having a best candidate for the presidential elections or by supporting particular policies in the referendums (Hix and Høyland, 2011:P130-131). However the referendum seems to be less significant, as in response to whether or not referendums provide accountability, Beetham argues that, referendums can only legitimize the changes and the extensions of power which is made to the institution not the daily use of power (Beetham and Lord, 1998:P15).

Furthermore, Hix is not hopeless about the democratic politics in the EU as he argues that the EU has a potential to practice democratic politics such as the competitions over the agenda and direction of the policies which will eventually lead to the connection between the citizens preferences and the EU policies (FOLLESDAL and HIX 2006:P553). Therefore, Hix maintains that for democratic EU we need the following; First, the real competition between political parties and elites for the highest position in the EU institutions for instance, the President of the Commission. Second, the preferences of citizens should be based on the “rivalry policy platform” in the elections of the European Parliament or candidates for the main office. This can be done by changing the EU parliament from proportional to the majoritarian model where the winner takes more responsibility and setting the agenda and policy directions or more transparent EU Council when it acts as a legislator (Hix, 2008: P 138-155). Third, the winning elections are translated to the legislative and executive performance by organized political parties (Hix and Høyland, 2011:P131).

Moreover, the most significant point in Hix’s solutions is the competition for the Commission president
chair as it can be compared to the position of the prime minister in the national governments. However, “the Commission president is appointed through top secret negotiations and horse-trading between the EU heads of government” which led to the lack of the contestation and horse racing towards that post between different candidates with different political rivalries (Hix, 2008: P 76-77). Thanks for the EU enlargement and the Qualified Majority System in the Council which makes it difficult for the EU to remain with only one candidate as the consensus becomes harder to obtain (Hix, 2008: P 155-162).

Hix detects two choices for the selection of executives in the institutionary design of the EU; first, there is a parliamentary model of choosing the executive where the transnational party groups have a choice in putting forward the candidate for President of the Commission. To do this, the link between the local and European parties would have to be cut to avoid the selection of the candidate by the domestic parties of the member states. If the connection remained the same, it could be done by the removal of the interest of domestic parties in the European Parliament vote. However, the parliamentary model faces a major problem even if these procedures are followed because the citizens would treat the elections as a national contestation for the executive leadership.

Second, the presidential model electing the President of Commission directly by citizens. Under this model, party leaders should announce their support for the candidates before the European election and the candidates should have their own “manifestos” for the period of their presidency as the five-year program. Candidates should also compete against each other in debates to be more recognizable and identifiable (Hix, 2008: P 155-162).

Moreover, Hix prefers presidential model to avoid the second order elections by the fact that; firstly, it would be hard for national parties to bring the achievement of their governments into the contest. Secondly, the national parties would have to declare their support for one of the candidates before the elections taking place because of the pressure from media and consequently more accountability can be produced. However, this
model could not be easily implemented, because it needs institutional reform in the EU which can be achieved through the treaty amendment. The current treaty does not permit the direct election of the president of the Commission by citizens (Hix, 1997: P10-12).

4. CONCLUSION

In conclusion, there is continuous debate about the “democratic deficit” in the EU. Taking the argument from the Hix on the democratic deficit specifically when he states that “without an electoral contest connected to political behavior in these EU institutions it is impossible for voters to punish MEPs or governments for voting the ‘wrong way’” (FOLLESDAL and HIX 2006:P553). It can be implied that the European Union does not have the same democracy as is practiced in the national governments of the member states. This is because what is practiced in the European Union is different or does not match what is required in democratic politics. However, while we accept the existence of the democratic deficit, we cannot deny and ignore some of the democratic practices in the EU for instance the election of the EU Parliament.

The main problem with the EU, Hix argues, is that the democratic practices in the EU do not lead to real change in the direction of policies and the formation of government. Therefore under the light of these facts it can be said that, if the EU considers itself to be a supranational institution, more democratic practices would be needed. This is because EU policies have a direct effect on the people’s lives and its policies should reflect the people’s needs.

The EU acts like both an intergovernmental and supranational organization at the same time but throughout the development of the EU, the treaty changes have taken the EU towards more supranational nature which expanded the policies to social and political field. Consequently, the political parties, citizens, and interest groups found themselves in the different side of the debate about the policies and practices of the EU. Hence,
the main question here is how the EU becomes more democratic and what are the obstacles in its way of democratic politics.

As political scientists are divided about the analysis of the problems of the EU, similarly there are different solutions put forward by the scholars of the EU. It can be said that the presidential model of the EU which put forward by Hix is the more favorable solution. However, that depends on the fact that, how much the member states are able to compromise on their national sovereignty. The future decades will answer most of the questions which seem to be very complicated in making a prediction about them.
REFERENCES:


لا يمكن تغيير طبيعة الاتحاد الأوروبي من خلال الاحداث من الاتحاد الاقتصادي إلى السياسة أدى إلى طرح العديد من الأسئلة المتعلقة بالعجز الديمقراطي. السؤال الرئيسي هو كيف يمكن لاتحاد الأوروبي أن يكون أكثر ديمقراطيا وكيف يمكن أن يتغلب على العقبات بطريقة لأجابة هذا السؤال يعتمد الباحث على التحليل النظري. البحث الأول هو تحليل العجزات القياسية للديمقراطية الذي حدده (هیکس) وينتقد الاتحاد الأوروبي للافتقار من المسؤولية وضعف البرلمان والشرعية غير المباشرة في حين أن سياساتها لها تأثير مباشر على المواطنين.

على النقيض من ذلك، يجادل مايون ومورفسيك بأن الاتحاد الأوروبي لا يحتاج إلى إضفاء الشرعية بطريقة مماثلة للدول الديمقراطية. لأنه يعتبر كدولة تنظيمية وحكومات الدول الأعضاء لديهم مسؤوليات مباشرة. البحث الثاني يدرس العجز الديمقراطي بين سياسات إعادة التوزيع حيث يوجد رابحون وخاسرون مثل ديمقراطية الأغلبية والسياسات التشريعية حيث لا يوجد خاسرون حتى لو لم يكن الجميع فائزون. يتناول البحث الأخير الحلول التي طرحها الفقهاء بناءً على وجهة نظرهم للمشاكل. و في النتيجة الختامية، يتفق الباحثين على أن هناك بعض العجزات الديمقراطية حيث يعمل الاتحاد الأوروبي مثل المنظمة الدولية والمنظمة فوق الوطنية في نفس الوقت.

 PJ: نهاد حمزة

الملخص

تغير طبيعة الاتحاد الأوروبي من خلال الاحداث من الاتحاد الاقتصادي إلى السياسة أدى إلى طرح العديد من الأسئلة المتعلقة بالعجز الديمقراطي. السؤال الرئيسي هو كيف يمكن لاتحاد الأوروبي أن يكون أكثر ديمقراطيا وكيف يمكن أن يتغلب على العقبات بطريقة لأجابة هذا السؤال يعتمد الباحث على التحليل النظري. البحث الأول هو تحليل العجزات القياسية للديمقراطية الذي حدده (هیکس) وينتقد الاتحاد الأوروبي للافتقار من المسؤولية وضعف البرلمان والشرعية غير المباشرة في حين أن سياساتها لها تأثير مباشر على المواطنين.

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