The Political Economy of Class Formation and Class Structure in the Southern Kurdistan: 1991-2021

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Abstract
This article examines the dynamics of class formation from a historical sociology perspective after the formation of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), roughly from 1991 to 2021. It then reviews the KRG period (1991-2021) to trace the process of class formation in the newly-born government. After that, the researchers explore the pattern and nature of class structure and the state in the Southern Kurdistan from 1991 to 2021. This article presents the role of the world economy and the Southern Kurdistan political parties in class formation. For example, the government relied on the selling of natural resources such as crude oil, and a small proportion of people received a tremendous amount of wealth from the government by utilizing political power, and their class position changed to a new one, which is a bourgeois class. As this is a historical sociology study, the following theories will be used: Dependency theory and the world-systems theory are essential in this article because they will evaluate the relationship between classes and compare the Southern Kurdistan with other countries in the capitalist world system. The qualitative methods which have been used in this article include critical analysis of written sources and secondary data, including official statistics of the KRG.

Keywords: Historical Sociology, Southern Kurdistan, Petit-bourgeoisie, Comprador Bourgeoisie, National Bourgeoisie, World System.

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Introduction

Social classes exist in every society and Kurdistan is not an exception. There are many theoretical perspectives about the concept of class and its nature, from liberal to neo-Marxist ones. In this article, the authors have adopted a theoretical framework taken from the Dependency theory and the world-systems theory. From the Dependency theory, the concepts of "national bourgeoisie" and "comprador bourgeoisie" have been taken (Frank, 1967) and applied on the sociological context of the Southern Kurdistan. Furthermore, from the world-systems theory, the principle that the class structure and class formation of different societies are not domestically determined but they are under the direct influence of the capitalist world system has been applied on the Southern Kurdistan. Each region's position in the international division of labour in the capitalist world economy determines the class structure of every society (Wallerstein, 1974).

The methodology of this research is based on some qualitative methods, including the critical analysis of written documents and secondary formal data and statistics. Given that there are not many sources and significant research from the historical sociology perspective, therefore, several information collection tools were used in this study, including the assessment of the KRG statistics.

The case of the Southern Kurdistan

Significant changes happened in the Southern Kurdistan's class structure since the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) was established in 1991. These changes have been most pronounced since 2003, when the United States and its allies liberated Iraq. For example, some of the petit-bourgeoisie formed before 1991 rose to the status of bourgeoisie following the events of 1991, and they have made an effort to forge strong relationships with Kurdish political parties and countries in the centre and semi-periphery of the world system.

As we know, the Southern Kurdistan was meticulously cleared between the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s by forces from Iraq, Turkey, and Syria to cut off the rebels' sources of supplies and recruits. The purposeful destruction of their subsistence homes, livestock, crops, forests, and wells prevented the return of many million Kurdish peasants, who were forced to leave their communities. The eradication of the peasants impacted Kurdistan's class structure, demographics, and ecological viewpoint by depopulating the countryside and resulting in many impoverished urban people (Salih, 2022: 188–189). These developments not only changed the demographics of the Southern Kurdistan but also changed its class structure and new classes formed, including different spectrums of bourgeoisie and lumpen proletariat.

Kurdish towns experienced a quadrupling or tripling of their population, while significant Kurdish communities appeared in non-Kurdish cities and cities with a varied population became predominantly Kurdish. These enormous structural changes have a variety of political
repercussions in the Kurdish regions of Turkey and Iraq. On the other hand, the US-led invasions of Iraq in 1991 and 2003 made it possible for the KRG to emerge and eventually receive legal recognition inside Iraq after Saddam Hussein. Due to a lack of industry and the loss of farmland, the area relied on various rent-generating activities, such as handling foreign aid in the 1990s, regulating smuggling routes, and selling oil since the middle of the 2000s. The social structures and class connections that developed alongside the Kurdish national movement in Iraq in the 1960s and 1970s were severely damaged by the violence that tore through the Kurdish region in the 1980s (Esposti, 2020: 35).

A pivotal point in the history of the Southern Kurdistan was the withdrawal of Saddam Hussein's forces from the Kurdish region in October 1991. The Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK's) peshmerga troops gained complete control over the predominantly Kurdish governorates of Dohuk, Erbil, and Sulaymaniyah due to the no-fly zone over northern Iraq that the US and its allies enforced. The economic and social situation in the region was dreadful; moreover, after Saddam Hussain's soldiers withdrew from the region after more than a decade of destructive fighting and the introduction of international sanctions on Iraq in 1990, the Kurdish region was subjected to an additional domestic embargo.

In these circumstances, a new class structure gave the political elite and descendants of the previous elite military control over the region's meagre means of accumulation equipment due to the civil conflicts that broke out in the 1990s. The population needs to be less productive and more reliant on handouts simultaneously. This network of class links was enhanced with the acceptance of Kurdish autonomy and the creation of a single KRG following the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003. The Kurdish political elite amassed a sizable amount of the revenue from selling the region's oil for themselves since the security apparatus was still under the authority of the two major ruling parties. They appear to have spent much of their money on their military might and commercial expansion, and as a result, less capital goes to investing in improving manufacturing and agriculture.

Based on the information in this article, it can be concluded that the Southern Kurdistan's class structure has evolved from 1921–1991. For instance, the Southern Kurdistan was a semi-feudal society with two primary classes: aristocracy who owned land and cattle, and peasants who had no tangible possessions other than their labour; and a small marginal class: petit-bourgeoisie. However, after 1991, particularly since 2003, when the Southern Kurdistan was increasingly opened to the outside world, we can observe a significant shift in class structure and capitalist ownership from rural to urban areas. According to the KRG's Statistical Board in the Ministry of Planning, in 2016 and 2017, in terms of land ownership, the total number of people owning 900 acres and above was 138 owners in the Kurdistan Region. Also, the number of capitalists has reached an unprecedented number in comparison with the previous historical era of the Southern
Kurdistan (1921-1991) which was mainly without any capitalist in its precise meaning. This shows that upper-class ownership has changed enormously since 1991, especially after 2003.

The changes in the class structure of the Southern Kurdistan: 1991-2021

Throughout 1980s and 1990s, due to a long cycle of violence, many Kurdish peasants were compelled to evacuate their villages and seek safety in the Kurdish towns. By evacuating hundreds of settlements and depopulating the countryside, Baghdad's counter-insurgency strategies—which culminated in the horrifying Anfal Campaign of 1986–1989 were primarily designed to remove the Kurdish guerrilla's sources of supplies. As a result of this programme, hundreds of thousands of peasants were uprooted and relocated to coercive societies, and crude new settlements were built beside crucial roadways in army-controlled areas of Iraqi Kurdistan (HRW, 1993; Ihsan, 2017).

The Iraqi army's removal of villages and woods along the Iranian border resulted in large areas of the countryside being uninhabitable due to defoliant chemicals, landmines, deforestation, and loss of irrigation and well systems. This strategy decimated Kurdish agriculture and resulted in a significant trend towards forced urbanisation. The inflow of people from the countryside helped Kurdish cities grow tremendously. While the rest of Iraq had no growth between 1977 and 1997, the average urban population in the Kurdish area climbed by 23% (Esposti, 2021: 4; Ihsan, 2017).

In Iraq, whose economy was still primarily focused on agriculture, the Kurds produced around half of the country's barley and a third of its wheat, according to Leezenberg (2000). However, the conflict's devastation and the negative impact of oil profits on other non-oil sectors resulted in a dramatic decrease in agricultural profitability. The decline of agriculture and the rise of public support caused the ancient aristocracy to progressively move away from land ownership and into other more lucrative activities. In addition, as a political inducement, the government provided lucrative contracts for infrastructure initiatives it backed. With money acting as the primary source of power rather than property, this strategy eventually transformed an elderly tribe of landowners into a group of businesses that were backed by the dictatorship.

In order to put down the Peshmergas' rebellion against the Iraqi government, tribal chiefs in the Kurdish area also had the social power to form jash (traitor) organisations, or loyalist militia, from pro-government Kurdish tribes. By enlisting people from other tribes, the jash leaders established their organisation with direct government assistance. This practice increased the tribal leadership's control over their supporters and provided them with a new funding source. For rural Kurds, joining the jash may occasionally be their only chance to get fair pay, escape being enlisted in the military, and avoid being sent to the Iranian front. The tribe chiefs could employ this system's semi-private army for their ends. However, the political expediency of the ruling class
led them to support the Ba'athist government; however, when Kurdish forces reached the region in 1991, they quickly renounced their support (Leezenberg, 2006; Esposti, 2021: 5).

After the Iraqi army withdrew from the Southern Kurdistan in 1991, the KDP and PUK established long-term military dominance over the Kurdish region. One of the two factions' first challenges was with the jash or collaborators. Due to its military focus, which enabled it to take advantage of the two main economic activities available: handling foreign aid and regulating smuggling, this new elite amassed enormous wealth. The Kurdish parties aggressively campaigned for the support of their former rivals rather than taking a harsh stance against prior government collaborators. A new ruling elite was created due to this process by combining the peshmerga with the old jash nobility (Leezenberg, 2006: 2-11). This new ruling elite which is discussed by Leezenberg is mostly composed of the comprador bourgeoisie whose interests lie in exporting natural resources products (especially crude oil) and importing consuming commodities.

The Southern Kurdistan's system of government, which had been established in the 1990s following the end of the Ba'athist administration, was forced to re-establish a united KRG structure after the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, which Baghdad had officially recognised. On the other hand, this new institutional framework solidified the class structure developed in the 1990s. Since Iraq was liberated in 2003, the economy of the Kurdistan Region grown dramatically. The local elite opened up the Kurdish economy in the 1990s when the embargo and sanctions hampered it and were repealed, leading to a massive infusion of foreign investment. The KRG, governed by the KDP-PUK duopoly, profited from a high level of political stability in contrast to the rest of Iraq, which was ravaged by the insurgency against the American occupation and the growth of sectarian violence (Natali, 2010; Noori, 2018).

The formation of a united KRG under the framework of the 2005 Iraqi Constitution crystallised a set of class relations in the Kurdish region that had started to emerge in the 1990s. When the region was freed in 1991, the two main Kurdish political parties fought for the co-optation of the ancient Kurdish nobility. A new governing class was created due to this process, consisting of an alliance between former party officials who became politicians and the local elite, which included tribal chiefs, business people supported by the state, and former commanders of the jash battalions. Due to the dominance of the security forces, this new governing elite could collect a sizable chunk of the cash generated from several sources of rent, mainly oil export, after 2005 (Esposti, 2020:172). This class alliance marks the start of a still-developing process of class formation. The semi-feudal class structure of Southern Kurdistan in the twentieth century has been replaced by a capitalist class structure that is similar to the universal one in some aspects but different in others due to local factors, particularly the Kurdish national movement, as a result of this process, which has drastically altered the class structure of the Kurdish society.
The KRG could now depend on a consistent source of money, thanks to the 2005 constitution's affirmation of Kurdistan's autonomy. In 2003, the regional administration was entitled to 17% of Iraq's budget, virtually entirely obtained from oil exports, based on a population estimate of 3.9 million in the three Kurdish governorates. Budget transfers from Baghdad accounted for nearly 80% of KRG income between 2006 and 2014, while tax collections stayed at most 5% of the total. This influx of funds and the region's political stability allowed for a chaotic economic expansion. The KRG's economy was reported to have expanded from $18 billion in 2008 to $27 billion in 2012, despite the need for accurate GDP data distinct from Iraq's. To some extent, using these resources to rebuild the Kurdistan Region's economy by developing its productive sectors, the Kurdish elite embraced a development model based on the oil-producing monarchies of the Persian Gulf (World Bank Group, 2016: Xi; Woolf, 2011). However, the power structure and class hierarchy formed in the Southern Kurdistan in the 1990s and 2000s were destroyed by the crisis that started in 2014. Hundreds of thousands of Kurds were impoverished due to the KRG's inability to pay public wages while the country was under ISIL siege, and oil prices were at historic lows (Esposti, 2020:173).

Between 2006 and 2012, $22 billion was invested in the Kurdistan Region, with 21% coming from foreign direct investment or joint ventures with local partners. In 2012, 55% of all public investment in Iraq went to the KRG. Due to the highly favourable tax conditions that multinational businesses enjoy, the impact of this capital movement on KRG revenues has been minimal. Due to the lack of significant restrictions on the hiring of foreign personnel and the lenient visa regime, the KRG investment strategy has generated enormous profits for international companies and their local partners while having little impact on general employment and the broader population (World Bank Group, 2016: 2). This policy has produced a large group of unemployed workers. Some of these unemployed young workers have academic degrees, potentially threatening socio-political instability.

The impact of crude oil and Kurdish politics on class structure and class formation
As previously indicated, the 1990s international assistance flood to the Kurdish region gave crucial humanitarian help while adversely affecting the territory's economic structure. Organisations like the UN were unable to interact directly with KRG institutions. Local warlords, comprising former elite and military officials, the two major political parties, and the area's militarisation may easily grab control of the situation. Once the major political parties founded or acquired control of local NGOs, many were instantly seen as lucrative funding sources and effective clientelization tools (Leezenberg, 2000: 40).

Conversely, the politicisation of aid distribution assisted the ongoing process of class formation by increasing the chances for the local elite to get richer. The public's awareness of NGOs'
political affiliation strengthened the notion that political parties, rather than public institutions like the KRG, were in charge of providing essential services. This crystallised a pattern of party-state relations that people who had experienced the Ba'athist regime were already familiar with. The oil-for-food program's massive assistance from 1996 increased the possibility of personal wealth, leading to "an exponential growth in personal riches for local businesses" that held contracts for crude sales and food distribution (Natali, 2010: 57–58).

The other lucrative economic activity in the area was illegal commerce, supported by international sanctions and a domestic embargo. Large-scale smuggling was placed over the boundaries of the Kurdish area. It swiftly became the most profitable source of funding for some political parties and a source of richness for the influential figures within them. The Ibrahim Khalil border crossing with Turkey in Dohuk was by far the most lucrative, with an estimated annual illicit trade turnover of $750 million. The KDP's dominance over it brought about the start of the civil war. The embargo encouraged the smuggling of a wide range of goods into the region, as well as a "privatised oil trafficking" with Kurdish oil being illegally marketed in Turkey, in violation of both international sanctions and the domestic blockade (Leezenberg, 2005: 640).

Without opposition from its opponents, each political party was able to increase its hold over its specific sub-region, especially as the oil-for-food programme started to promise exceptional returns. Certain political parties in the Kurdistan Region built a structure dominated by the party bureau. Its armed forces strictly govern them to benefit their wealthy families and influential connections in politics and business. This accumulation process impacted the development of class relations in the Kurdish region. The Chamber of Commerce of Sulaymaniyah could claim nearly a thousand millionaires in a territory ravaged by conflict and reliant on humanitarian help (Natali, 2010: 100). The oil-for-food program's $50 food basket helped more than half of Kurdish households boost their $25 monthly payments to make ends meet. As a result of the destruction of their ability to engage in agriculture and other forms of production, poor Kurds were pushed to become patrons of a developing patronage system (Leezenberg, 2005: 640).

The impact of the Kurdistan Regional Government policy on class formation in the Southern Kurdistan

The most apparent impact of the influx of foreign money was the building boom, which transformed the skylines of the major Kurdish cities in just a few years. Private developers built vast housing complexes, residential communities, five-star hotels, and sizable shopping centres. In 2010, the cost of housing in Erbil reached $423 per square metre, with the price of a 250 square metre home rising from $5,000 in 1996 to $153,000 in 2010, rendering a large chunk of the city unaffordable for the majority of the population. The KRG's investment-friendly policies in the construction industry helped Turkey the most, going through a tumultuous economic boom in the
middle and late 2000s. Turkish investment in the Kurdistan region’s real estate reached $4.3 billion in 2012, and Turkish construction businesses played a key role in repairing the region's crucial infrastructure (Natali, 2010:99). This is while Turkey has been and still is the number one enemy of Kurdness and refrains from recognizing the Kurdish identity of the Kurdistan region and calls it “the north of Iraq.”

The institutionalisation of the KRG in the 2000s helped to complete the transition to a rentier economy. Due to its complete control over the KRG institutions and military infrastructure, the ruling elite that emerged in the 1990s could syphon off a sizeable percentage of the regional budget. The Kurdish ruling class pursued an accumulation strategy based on taking advantage of corruption, misappropriation, and awarding public contracts, particularly in the construction industry, to businesses controlled by political leaders or their allies rather than investing in productive endeavours. This approach was made possible by the KRG institutions' need for more openness and political oversight. As previously said, seeing these behaviours through the lens of class relations casts a new light on the function of the autonomous oil strategy advocated since 2007. Unlike the budget transfer from Baghdad, the production of income inside the KRG's borders significantly increased the amount of money that could be diverted to private pockets. It multiplied how this might happen. Independent investigations place the figures in the billions of dollars range despite the challenge of determining exact figures.

Out of a population of little over 5 million, 1.4 million Iraqi Kurds were employed by the regional government in 2013, and the KRG spent more than half of its budget on their wages and pensions. Between 2007 and 2012, the KRG added 750,000 new employment opportunities, more than 80% of which were in the public sector, which in 2014 employed 53% of the region's labour force. A small portion of public employees made between $150 and $200 monthly. Many times, a family's whole livelihood depended on a single income, making it reliant on the major political parties and local power brokers in control of public employment. Due to this system, a sizable portion of the populace joined the two parties’ top leaders and patronage networks. Even if one wage barely kept a family out of poverty, working for the government was still a much superior option to the uncertainty of the private sector. According to government statistics, which are probably conservative, the unemployment rate in 2009 was around 18%. Additionally, the working conditions in the private sector were far from ideal: in 2012, most poor people were employed by private firms, according to the World Bank. Kurdish businesses increasingly used seasonal workers from other parts of Kurdistan and the rest of Iraq and migrant labour from Asia and Africa in the construction, agricultural, and service sectors (World Bank Group, 2016; Anaid, 2019: 25; Srhnk, 2011: 16).

However, the Southern Kurdistan was experiencing extraordinary growth when the political and economic crisis hit the KRG in 2014. Despite fast-growing imbalances, just 3.4% of Kurds
lived in abject poverty compared to 13.3% of Iraqis. Rural areas continued to be the primary concentration of poverty, contributing to further urbanisation. Class distinctions that had started to surface in the early 1990s when the major political parties acquired power in the area were further cemented during this growth era. While keeping the rest of the population oppressed and dependent on government handouts, the party leaders and their allies could pocket most of the wealth generated by oil exports. However, this structure began to fall apart in 2014 due to political and economic developments (Esposti, 2020:174).

This trend of wealth accumulation at the top had an impact on politics. Most Kurds depend on government employment given out by the ruling parties due to the weakness of the private sector. The political elite could quell popularity against their actions by requiring party allegiance as a condition of employment. The Kurdish elite had a dual motivation for the close connections that certain political groups formed with their neighbours. The region's economic penetration by Turkey and Iran presents rich business opportunities for Kurdish companies with ties to the political system.

The policy adopted by the KRG to increase domestic production capacity shows that the production level has grown year after year. However, despite having more production capacity, local factories have produced less than their capacity. This may be because imported goods are sold cheaper inside the Southern Kurdistan. This requires the support of the KRG to reduce the prices of taxes, water, electricity and raw materials to increase domestic production while being viewed from a sociological perspective, which will strengthen the national bourgeoisie against the comprador bourgeoisie.

The KRG is attempting to meet domestic needs by issuing permits to open industrial establishments. After the liberation of Iraq and South Kurdistan by the United States and its allies in 2003, the situation has become more dependent on imported goods from foreign countries, especially both Turkey and Iran. These two countries have constantly tried to sell their goods in the Southern Kurdistan through the traders who are more dependent on them. These traders can be categorised as the comprador bourgeoisie, i.e. the part of the capitalist class that is more dependent on other nations than their own. The General Directorate of Planning and Follow-Up of the Trade and Industry Ministry of the KRG, in 2017, showed the exchange of goods at the official border points of the KRG in 2016 was about 5.7 billion US dollars, but in 2017 it increased to about 7 billion US dollars. Imports of goods from Iran fell from US$3.2 billion in 2016 to less than US$2 billion in 2017. This decline was due to political sanctions imposed by Iran following the Kurdistan Region's independence referendum in 2017. Imports from Arab countries amounted to US$4 billion. Overall, imported goods from countries worldwide in 2017 exceeded US$16.1 billion compared to 2014 by 10% and increased by 3% in 2015 (The Trade and Industry Ministry, 2018).
Economic infiltration by Iranian companies into PUK-controlled regions like Sulaymaniyah is similar to the political ties between Tehran and the PUK. Beyond the region's dependence on food and consumer goods produced in Iran, Iran has a considerable economic influence on Sulaymaniyah. The Kurdish political elite collaborates with Iranian businesses and, more or less transparently, participates in the benefits of Iranian investment (Al Hashem: 2018). This is another example of the concept of comprador bourgeoisie.

The proximity of the KDP-controlled region to the Turkish border in the 1990s boosted relations between Turkey and the KDP. Conversely, once Recep Tayyip Erdogan's Islamist Justice and Development Party took power in Turkey and defeated the viscerally anti-Kurdish elite, open relations could only intensify in the late 2000s. These initiatives led to opening of a Turkish consulate in Erbil in 2010. Since then, Turkish business ventures in the KRG have grown rapidly, and cross-border trade is booming. Similar to how Iranian economic infiltration helped the local Kurdish elite, this economic cooperation also did. Profits soared when the KRG began shipping oil to Turkey (Park, 2012).

The direct control of the armed forces, which were never permitted to transform into a politically neutral regional army, has allowed the Kurdish elite to appropriate the wealth created by various forms of rent, including smuggling and foreign humanitarian aid in the 1990s and the sale of oil after 2005. The Kurdish subaltern classes' reliance on different governmental handouts is the only way to survive in that environment, not because of a lack of a work ethic or a culture of dependence. The Kurdistan political system has yet to manage to support the expansion of a thriving economy. The political elite pushed a sizable portion of the people into their patronage network by dispersing some of the region's rich people through public wages, pensions, and subsidies (Esposti, 2020:172).

From this perspective, if we make a sociological reading of this situation, domestic production is less than importing products from foreign countries, especially two countries of Turkey and Iran, which are neighbour countries of the Southern Kurdistan. For example, according to the KRG's Statistical Board at the Ministry of Planning in 2018, the imports of food items in 2017 were more than US $4 billion, while gold, silver and natural jewels were worth more than US$2 billion (The Ministry of Planning, 2018). However, the Ministry of Trade and Industry - General Directorate of Trade - Statistics of General Directorate of Trade in 2021 imports of goods decreased significantly in 2021 to a total of about US$6.5 billion, of which the most significant type was industrial materials, with approximately more than US$2.5 billion, followed by construction materials, with one billion US dollars (The Ministry of Trade and Industry, 2021). In contrast, the General Directorate of Planning and Follow-Up of the Trade and Industry Ministry of the KRG 2017 in 2016, exports to foreign countries excluding oil products were less than
US$100 million. Nevertheless, at the same time, more than US$2 billion of the region's domestic production has been exported to other parts of Iraq (The Trade and Industry Ministry, 2018).

**Conclusion**

The data of this article makes it abundantly evident that the Southern Kurdistan's class structure started to evolve after 1991 in several distinct ways. This is primarily because of the historical context, wherein the Iraqi government had adopted this long-term programme of demographic change in South Kurdistan, particularly the rural border districts, in the 1980s and early 1990s to prevent people from backing the Peshmerga in their conflict with the Iraqi government. The work experiences of people who settled there were impacted by the peasants' transfer to the metropolis. Due to shifts in class structures inside cities brought on by the labour done in the rural under some conditions do not have similar work in the metropolis in the long term.

Saddam’s regime imposed a domestic embargo on the Kurdish area after more than ten years of violent fighting and the imposition of international sanctions on Iraq in 1990. For instance, the region was in a horrible economic and social situation. Due to these wars and embargoes, a new class structure developed, giving the political elite and members of the former military elite power over the little resources that could be accumulated in the region. On the other hand, the close links that some political parties had with their neighbours served two functions for the Kurdish elite. Kurdish comprador business may profit from the area's Turkish and Iranian economic infiltration. The class structure and class formation of the Southern Kurdistan were affected by all of these economic shifts, which caused this society to transition from a semi-feudal class structure to a capitalist one.

After 1991, practically after 2003, a new capitalist class substituted the feudal elite as the ruling class. This bourgeoisie which can be called "political party bourgeoisie" (namely a bourgeoisie which is grown due to its special relations with two main political parties in the region), can be classified into two categories: national bourgeoisie and comprador bourgeoisie. Amid this, it is obvious that the comprador bourgeoisie is more powerful in the Southern Kurdistan due to the crude oil export and the lack of domestic production. As mentioned above, the comprador bourgeoisie tried to adapt itself to the changes after 1991, especially after 2003 in the Southern Kurdistan. This is because the Kurdistan region has tried to be part of the world system that dominates the global market. This was an opportunity for the comprador bourgeoisie that could unite its interests with centre and semi-periphery countries, along with the main political parties in the Southern Kurdistan, they have paved the way for this class to make international trade with foreign countries, and it has become stronger day by day.

In addition to the support of the Southern Kurdistan bourgeoisie, it can be said that the centre and semi-periphery countries are the prominent supporters of this class to play their role
effectively inside and with foreign countries. On the other hand, a working class that is mainly employed in the public sector has emerged, and some members of this working class are employed in the private sector. Therefore, at the moment, the class structure of the Southern Kurdistan is quite capitalistic, but some features make it different from other countries due to the circumstances of the Kurdish national movement and the dominance of the parties’ politics.
ناپورییی سیاسیی فورمگرتنی چینایەتی و پێکهاتەی چینایەتی لە باشووری کوردستان: 1991-2021

دلشاد سەبری عەلی ١ - نەییپووب کەریمی ٢

1) ٣٩٤ بەشی کومەناسی، فاکەڵتی ناداتب، زانکۆی سۆران، سۆران، هەرێمی کوردستان، عێراق.

پۆختە

ئەم توێژینەوەیە لە ڕوانگەی کومەڵناسیی مێژووییەوە لێکولیئێوەیە، لە سیاسەیەکەی کە دەوای دروستبوونی حکومەتی هەرێمی کوردستان لە ١٩٩١ تاکو ٢٠٢١ دەکات. پاشان بە پێداچوونوو لە ماتی حکومەتی هەرێمی کوردستان (١٩٩١-٢٠٢١) دەوای بۆ پێسەی فورمگرتنی چینایەتی لە دەوەیەکی تازە دەوە. بۆ لەو ماویەدا. دوای نهەوە، توێژەرەکەیە لە شیواز و سروشی چینایەتی، سروشی چینایەتی و کومەڵگای باشووری کوردستان دەکاتی. توێژەرەکەیە رێژەیەکی کە کە چینی بە بەکارهاتوو لە چینی باشووری کوردستان وەکوو ١٩٩١-٢٠٢١. بەوپێیە، توێژەرەکەیە گەورەیەکی کە چینی بە بەکارهاتوو لە پرۆسەی فورمگرتنی چینایەتی لە سوڵێکە. توێژەرەکەیە ڕۆڵی ئابووری جیهانی و حزبە سیاسییەکانی باشووری کوردستان دەکات. ئەم توێژینەوەیە ڕۆڵی چینایەت و حزبە سیاسییەکانی باشووری کوردستانی بەکاردەهێنرێن. بۆ نمووە، حکومەت پشتی پێشتری سامانە سروشتیکان بەسەرەوە ١٩٩١-٢٠٢١. سەرەکی چینی بە بەکارهاتوو لە سوڵێکە. توێژینەوەیە بریتیە لە میتۆدی چینایەتی.

کلیله وشەکان: کومەناسیی مێژووییی، باشووری کوردستان، ورە بۆرژوازیی، بۆرژوازیی کومەراتور، بۆرژوازیی نهەوەیی، سیستەییی چینایی.
Reference


